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JUDICIAL DECISIONS ON CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE.
PROFESSORS CHESTER G. VERNIER AND ELMER A. WILCOX.
ASSAULT WITH INTENT TO KILL.
People v. Connors et al., Ill. 97 N. E. 643. Specific Intent. It is assault
with intent to murder for one topoint a loaded revolver at another, and com-
mand him to take off his overalls, and go out and join accused's labor union,
where there is an intent to kill if the command is not complied with, though
the intent is in the alternative, and is not executed because of compliance with
the condition.
CONSPIRACY.
Harris v. Commonwealth, Ya. App., 73 S. E. 561. Monopoly of Fire In-
surance Business. Defendants were charged with criminal conspiracy in cre-
ating and maintaining a monopoly in the fire insurance business in the city of
Newport News. There was no statute prohibiting such a combination. Held
that the charge must show "a combination of two or more persons, by some
concerted action, to accomplish some criminal or unlawful purpose, or to accom-
plish some purpose not in itself criminal or unlawful by criminal or unlawful
means." The common law did not prohibit the creation of a monopoly by in-
dividuals. The laws enacted against forestalling, regrating and engrossing re-
quired a wrongful motive to injure others, as by an increase of prices, and ap-
plied to provisions, or the "necessaries of life," or "articles of prime necessity,"
or of "merchandise," or "manufacture in the market." Insurance is in none of
these classes. *At most the combination charged is an agreement in restraint
of trade, but such agreements, though invalid, are not criminal. Hence a com-
bination to accomplish a criminal or unlawful purpose is not charged. The
charge does not show any illegal means, or that the acts were malicious, as in-
tended for the injury of others rather than the benefit of the parties to the
combination. Hence no common law crime is charged. If such combinations
are contrary to public policy, it is for the legislature to prohibit them.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
People v. Persce, (N. Y.) 97 N. E. 877. Right to Bear Arms. The Legis-
lature had power to enact Penal Law (Consol. Laws 1900, c. 40) al 1897, making
one who carries or possesses any weapon known as a slungshot, etc., guilty of
a felony, without requiring proof of an intent to unlawfully use it, construing
the statute as prohibiting the carrying of a slungshot, etc., within the immediate
control and use for unlawful purposes; the Bill of Rights not invalidating such
a statute.
The provision of the federal Constitution preserving the right of the people
to keep and bear arms was not intended to affect action by the states.
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CONTEMPT.
Re Merchants Stock & Grain Company et al., Petitioners. 32 Supreme
Court Reporter, 339. A judgment finding defendants in a pending suit in equity
guilty of contempt of its authority in violating an interlocutory injunction pre-
viously granted in a suit for the benefit of the complainant, and ordering the
payment of specified fines, three-fourths of which, when paid, should go to the
complainant "as compensation in part for the expenses incurred in prosecuting
these contempt proceedings," is punitive instead of remedial, and reviewable on
writ of error without awaiting a final decree in the suit in equity.
CRIMINAL INTENT.
State v. White, Mo., 140 S. V. 895. Mistake or Law. Defendant was con-
victed of felony, thereby becoming ineligible to vote. After his discharge from
the penitentiary he registered as a voter. His defense was that he disclosed
the facts to the registration officers, was told by them that his discharge papers
entitled him to vote, and believed that his citizenship had been restored. The trial
court charged that this belief would not be a defense. Held that the charge
was erroneous. "While it is true that everybody is supposed to know the law,
it is nevertheless a fact that the most trained judicial minds often have great
difficulty in determining what the law is on a given subject. * * * if it be
true that defendant did exhibit his discharge papers from the penitentiary to
the registration, officers of his voting precinct, and said officers informed him
that said discharge entitled him to vote, it would be a harsh rule to say that
he can be convicted of felony, because these election officers were mistaken and
gave him improper advice."
EVIDENCE..
Diaz v. U. S., 32 Sup. Ct. Repr., 250. Hearsay; Admitted Without Objec-
tion. Hearsay evidence admitted without objection is to be considered and
given its natural probative effect as if it were in law admissible.
FORMER JEOPARDY.
Gabriel Diaz v. United States, 32 Supreme C. Rep. 250. The prosecution
for homicide of a person previously convicted of an assault and battery from
which the death afterwards ensued does not place the accused twice in jeopardy
for the same offense, contrary to the act of July 1, 1902 (32 Stat. at L. 691,
Chap. 1369), a-5, enacting a Bill of Rights for the Philippine Islands, especially
where the jurisdiction of the justice of the peace before whom the assault and
battery charge was tried did not extend to homicide cases. (Lamar, J., dis-
senting.)
People v. Bevins, 134 N. Y. Suppl. 212. Different Offenses in Same Trans-
action. The Legislature can carve out of a single transaction several crimes,
so that the individual may in the same transaction commit several distinct
crimes, in which case an acquittal or conviction of one will not be a bar to an
indictment for another, under Code Cr. Proc. Sec. 9, providing that no person
can be subject to a second prosecution for a crime for which he has once been
prosecuted and duly convicted or acquitted.
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FORMER JEOPARDY.
Commonwealth v. Endrukat, Pa., go Aid. io89. Where the insanity of a
prisoner at the time of the trial has been set up in defense in a prosecution for
murder, and the jury, being instructed to pass on both the question of guilt and
of insanity, has returned as one verdict, against the objection of the prisoner,
that he is guilty of murder in the first degree, and is insane at the time of trial,
and the jury has been discharged, and thereafter the court of its own motion
sets aside the verdict and grants a new trial, the prisoner may again be put on
trial on the same indictment, the finding that he was guilty of murder being
without authority and a mere, nullity, which should not have been accepted by
the court, so that there was no trial at all of the charge against him, and no
jeopardy.
Clarence v. State, 132 N. W. 395. Waived by Appeal. Defendant was
charged with murder in the first degree and convicted of murder in the second
degree. On appeal the conviction was set aside. He then asked for an order
that he be put on trial for manslaughter only, as he had been acquitted of mur-
der in the first degree, the Supreme Court had reversed the conviction of mur-
der in the second degree, and no new witnesses had been indorsed on the
information, so the same state of facts would be presented at the new trial.
Held, that the reversal of the judgment and remanding the case for another
trial placed the defendant in the same position in which he would have been
had there been no former trial. On proper evidence he could have been con-
victed of murder in either the first or second degree. Hence the denial of his
motion was not error.
GRAND JUvY.
U. S. v. Lewis, 192 Fed. 633. Regularity of Organizvation. Organization of
a federal grand jury was not vitiated because the jurors were sworn and im-
paneled the day before the date fixed by the court for their appearance; it not
being claimed that-any of the jurors were incompetent or disqualified, or that
accused was prejudiced.
HABEAS CORPUS.
State v. Riley, Minn., 133 N. W. 86. Not a Substitute for an Appeal. Re-
lator was convicted on a charge of using "vile and obscene language in the
presence of women." The statute made it a misdemeanor to "use in reference
to and in the presence of another * * * abusive or obscene language,
* * *naturally tending to provoke an .assault or any breach of the peace."
He brought habeas corpus on the ground that the complaint did not charge any
public offense and therefore the court had no jurisdiction and the judgment
was void. Held that while the judgment must have been reversed on an appeal,
as'the complaint did not state the name of the person in reference to whom
and in whose presence the language was used, or the language itself and its
natural tendency, the relator must be remanded into custody. The court had
jurisdiction of the person and of the offense attempted to be charged, and the
complaint, though defective, was sufficient to invoke its jurisdiction. But
habeas corpus reaches only jurisdictional defects, and cannot be used as a sub-
stitute for an appeal or writ of error.
JUDICIAL DECISIONS
INDETERMINATE SENTENCE ILLEGALLY IMPOSED.
Ex Parte Forscutt, Mich., 133 N. W. 315. Treated as Fixed Sentence for
Minimum Term. A statute provided a maximum of fifteen years' imprison-
ment for burglary. In 1903 an indeterminate sentence act was passed. In 1905
this was repealed, with no exception as to offenses already committed, and a
substitute enacted, applying to crimes "committed after this act takes effect."
After the act of 1905 took effect petitioner was convicted of a burglary com-
mitted in 1904, and sentenced to not less than seven years and six months nor
more than fifteen years' imprisonment. At the end of the minimum term, as
shortened by the allowance for good behavoir, he petitioned for a writ of
habeas corpus. Held that an indeterminate sentence could not be imposed under
the act of 1903, as that act was not in force when be was sentenced, nor under
the act of 1905 as that act did not apply to prior crimes. But the statute pro-
viding for the punishment of burglary was still in force and the sentence should
be treated as a fixed sentence for the minimum term imposed. That term hav-
ing expired the prisoner should be discharged.
INDICTMENT AND INFORMATION.
Arseneaux v. State, Tex. Cr. App., 140 S. W. 776. Sufficiency. Defend-
ant was convicted of larceny. The indictment charged that he stole property
of Hutchinson & Mitchell, a firm composed of Moses Hutchinson and H. L.
Mitchell, out of the possession of said Hutchinson & Mitchell "then and there
without the consent of said Hutchinson & Mitchell." Held that it was not
sufficient to allege the want of consent jointly, but the non-consent of each
owner should be alleged. Reversed and remanded.
State v. Duvenick, Mo., 140 S. W. 897. Clerical Error.. An indictment
concluded "agains the peace." Held that the defect was unworthy of serious
consideration or discussion. Though the clause was required by the state con-
stitution, it added nothing to the substance of the information. The omission
of the letter "t" was obviously a clerical error, and "agains" is idem sonas
with "against."
Hogue v. UnIted States, 192 Fed. 918. Sufficiency; Clerical Mistake. An
indictment charging perjury under oath before "a competent tribunal, to-wit,
before the United States District Clerk for the Northern District of Texas,"
is not vitiated by the obvious clerical mistake in using the word "clerk" instead
of "court."
State v. Silverman, N. H., 82 Atl. 536. Constitutional Validity. Pub. St.
1901, c. 273, aa 16, 17, relates to the embezzlement of certain specified things
and "any other effects or property whatqver" of the principal; and section 18
declares that an indictment for an offense mentioned in the two preceding sec-
tions shall be sufficient, if it alleges that the offender embezzled or converted
to his own use property of a certain amount, without specifying any particulars
of the embezzlement, and on the trial evidence that any property specified in
section 16 or 17 to any amount had been embezzled would sustain the indict-
ment Held, that section 18, in so far as it authorized a conviction on an in-
dictment failing to specifically describe the property embezzled was violative of
Bills of Rights, art. 15, providing that no subject shall be held to answer for
any crime, unless the same is fully, plainly, substantially, and formally described
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to him; and hence an indictment, charging embezzlement of "property" of R.
& Son to the amount of $695, was fatally defective.
Robinson v. State, Ind., 97 N. E. 929. Sufficiency. An indictment can be
successfully attacked for the first time on appeal only when it fails to state
facts sufficient to constitute a public offense; and an objection made for the
first time on appeal will not reach mere uncertainty or a defective statement
of the facts or a failure to observe technical formalities which could have been
corrected in the trial court.
Under Burns' Ann. St. 1908, sec. 2221, requiring the court on appeal to
disregard defects not prejudicing the substantial rights of accused, and which
could have been corrected before trial, an objection that the affidavit, on which
accused was tried, filed in open court by the prosecuting attorney, was not
indorsed as required by section 1990 will not be considered, when raised for the
first time on appeal. The court saying, p. 930, "It would be a reproach to the
law to require a judgment to be held for naught and the state put to the ex-
pense of another trial for a defect which did not prejudice the substantial
rights of appellant, and which he could have had corrected before trial, if it
in fact existed."
Hendricks v. U. S., 32 Supreme Court Reporter, 313. Frivolousness of
Federal Question. The contention that an indictment charging subordination of
perjury before a federal grand jury did not sufficiently set forth "the nature
and cause of the accusation" within the meaning of the U. S. Const., 6th
Amend., because it did not "set forth in some definite way the matter or thing
which was under investigation at the particular time, so that the defendant may
know as to what particular controversy the alleged false testimony is claimed
to be material, and how to meet the allegation of materiality," is too frivolous
to serve as the basis of a writ of error from the Federal Supreme Court to a
Circuit Court, to review a conviction under such indictment, where the descrip-
tion therein of the proceeding in which the perjury was committed is as fol-
lows: "* * * Sitting as a grand jury * * * and, among other matters,
inquiring into certain criminal violations-of the laws of the said United States
relating to the public lands and the disposal of the same and the unlawful
fencing thereof, which had then lately before been committed within the said
district."
1 NTOXICATING LIQuoRs.
Toles v. State, Ga. App., 73 S. E. 597. Keeping in Place of Business.
Defendant was convicted of the statutory offense of unlawfully keeping in-
toxicating liquors on hand at his place of business. He was employed to man-
age and run a poolroom, and there was evidence justifying the inference that
he had an interest in the business. Sixteen barrels of whiskey and several
empty whiskey barrels were found in the room. All had been shipped, as in-
dicated by their marks, to persons other than the defendant. Some at least
had been put into the room in defendant's absence, after the place had been
closed for the night, and the officers entered before it was-opened in the morn-
ing. Held that it is a violation of the law to keep intoxicating liquors on hand
at one's place of business when it is closed as well as when it is open to the
public. The place where the performance of the duties of a employee is re-
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quired is "his place of business" within the meaning of the prohibition law.
As all engaged in a misdemeanor are principals, one who, though not himself
an owner, keeps intoxicating liquors on hand at his public place of business, as
an employee or agent of the owner, violates the statute. The conviction was
affirmed.
State v. Donovan, S. Dak., 132 N. W. 698. Sunday Closing. With per-
mission from the police, defendant, a saloon keeper, entered his saloon on
Sunday to put coal on the fire and pump air on the beer. He was there about
three minutes and did not sell liquor to anyone or take any himself. The court
charged that "the statutes nowhere make -any exceptions or make any pro-
visions whereby anyone can go into a saloon on Sunday for any purpose what-
ever." Held,- that the police had no power to suspend the operation of the
statute or to determine its proper interpretation, hence the fact that defendant
had acted in good faidi on their suggestion would be no defense, but could
properly be urged in mitigation of punishment. As an abstract statement of law,
the charge was erroneous, for, though the statute contained no express ex-
ceptions, it would not apply to entering the saloon in case of fire, the breaking
of a waterpipe, or other unusual circumstance, not incidental to or connected
with the conduct of the business. But as the defendant's own testimony showed
that he entered for two purposes, on, of which was nnecessary and the other
incidental to the saloon business, the error was without prejudice and the con-
viction was affirmed.
Phillips v. State, Ga. Ct. App., 72 S. E. 429. Liability of Landlord. De-
fendant leased a small space at the rear of his store to a tenant who had a
pasteboard sign there indicating that he was a fish and oyster dealer. The
tenant's stock consisted of about a barrel and a half of bottled whisky, some
glasses and spoons, and there were about two barrels of empty whisky bottles.
There was no partition between this space and defendant's store. The trial
judge charged that if, with the knowledge of the landlord, the whisky was kept
in the portion of the store rented to the tenant, the landlord was guilty of keep-
ing liquor on hand at his place of business. Held, that while the charge was
not abstractly a correct statement of the law, under the evidence it was not
prejudicial. "The landlord must hide his knowledge behind something more
substantial than a sign made from a piece of pasteboard taken from the top of
a whisky barrel, advertising the sale of fish and oysters consisting of quart and
pint bottles of whisky."
LOAN SHARKs.
-State v. Davis, N. Car., 73 S. E. 130. Mortgage on Household and Kitchen
Furniture a Proper Classification. A statute made it a misdemeanor to charge
more than six per cent interest on any loan secured .by mortgage or otherwise
upon articles of household or kitchen furniture. Held that this did not deny
to -persons within the jurisdiction of the state the equal protection of, the laws
by making one law for those who loaned or borrowed on such security, and
-a different law for those who loaned or borrowed with other or no security.
The statute made a proper classification, as those who mortgage their household
goods are poor or ignorant men, who especially need protection from usurers;
in some of the cities there is a class of men against whom such protection is
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necessary; and the loss of those articles necessary for comfortable and decent
living entails great suffering on women and children and tends to break up
the home.
LARCENY.
Town of Wolcott s,. Stickles et al., Conn., 82 Atl. 572. A complaint, alleg-
ing that accused stole chickens of a specified value, charges the larceny of
"poultry" punishable by Gen. St. 1902, a 1211; the word chickens meaning poul-
try, and the word "poultry" including domestic fowls, generally or collectively,
reared for the table or for their eggs or feathers.
People v. Smith, Ill., 95 N. E. 1O41. Solicitation of the Offense. G. having
been arrested with a large number of postage stamps on his person, and hav-
ing said he got them of defendant, who was in charge of the mailing depart-
ment of L., the detectives consulted with representatives of L., and, as then
arranged, G. telephoned defendant that he had the money for the last stamps,
asking if defendant could get more stamps, and arranged to meet him. L.'s
representatives then marked some of its stamps. Defendant later met G., as he
had telephoned that he would, bringing $130 worth of stamps, including some
of those marked. Held, that there was no encouragement, soliciting, urging, or
advising of defendant by L., or its agents to commit the crime, preventing a
conviction, but that the criminal design and intent originated with defendant.
People v. Hunt, Ill., 96 N. E. 22o. Requisites of Indictment. A coTnmon
law indictment for the larceny of money, which merely describes the subject of
the larceny as a certain number of dollars in lawful money of the government.
of a stated value, is too indefinite, and an indiktment must contain a description,
so as to call to mind the particular coins and bills, and thus identify the thing
stolen, to 'identify the transaction charged, and to notify accused of the par-
ticular transaction; and this rule applies where the description is or may be
known to the grand jury.
Where an indictment for the larceny of money described the same as law-
ful of the United States, of the value of $55, and alleged that a more particular
description was unknown to the grand jury, and the prosecutor testified that the
money stolen consisted of five $Io bills and a $5 bill, and stated that he so testi-
fied before the grand jury, and there was no evidence that the grand jury was
unable to obtain a particular description of the money, the state failed to prove
the averment that a more particular description was unknown, necessitating a
discharge of accused from prosecution under the indictment, subject to the
right of the state to try him under a new indictment.
LOCAL OPTION LAW.
People v. Eberle, Mich., 133 N. W. 519. Depriving of Property Without
Due Process of Law. Under a local option law a county voted to prohibit the
manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors. When the prohibition took ef-
fett a brewing company in the county had on hand about 1700 barrels of beer
which they had been unable to sell. This would become worthless and un-
marketable if a new brew were not made and introduced into it occasionally,
to keep it alive. The company did this, the beer made after the manufacture
and sale had been prohibited being used only for this purpose, and not being
262
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old enough to be in a fit condition for drinking. The company contended that
it would be taking their, property without due process of law if they were pre-
vented from doing this. Held that the manufacture and sale of intoxicating
liquors may be regulated under the police power. If the exercise of the police
power causes a depreciation in value or loss of property affected thereby, this
is incidental to the business engaged in, and does not amount to a deprivation
of property without due process of law. The property was not taken for pub-
lic use but the owner was left free to make any lawful use of it, hence the
restrictions governing the exercise of the power of eminent domain do not
apply. The conviction was affirmed.
People v. Eberle, Mich., 133 N. W. 519. Excepting Local Wine and Cider.
A local option statute was enacted in 1889. It was amended in 1899 to permit
the sale of wine or cider from home-grown fruits in quantities not less thah
five gallons, and again in 1903 to permit the sale at whoJesale of wine and
cider made in the county adopting the law, to parties residing outside of that
county. The state conceded that these exceptions were unconstitutional, because
they discriminated against the citizens and products of other states. Held that
as these amendments did not enter into legislative consideration until long after
the original act was in active operation they could be stricken out, leaving the
act "complete in itself, and capable of being executed wholly independent of
that which was rejected." Hence the statute, as originally enacted, was in force.
OATH.
State v. Browning, Ia., 133 N. \V. 330. Form of Oath. The ordinary form
of oath was administered to two Jewish witnesses. They stated that they re-
garded it as binding on their consciences. On cross-examination each was
asked whether or not there was any other form of oath that he regarded as
of higher or greater sanctity or of greater solemnity or more binding upon him
than the oath taken. An objection to the question was sustained. Held any
form of oath is sufficient that the witness considers binding upon his conscience.
It was immaterial that the witness might consider some other form of oath
more binding upon him, as in such cases the law does not deal with compari-
sons. Moreover, objection to the form of an oath must be made before it is
administered, or it will be deemed waived. Nor was the question admissible to
discredit the witness. If one understands the nature of an oath and assumes
to take it as binding upon him he is a competent witness. Hence it was not
error to exclude the question.
ORDINANCES.
State v. Staples, N. Car., 73 S..E. 112. Regulating Billboards. While the
regulation of billboards, standing on private property, based upon aesthetic con-
siderations, is not within the police power of a city, an ordinance prohibiting
the erection and maintenance of such boards if the bottoms are less than
twenty-four inches from the ground, unless they are erected against a solid
wall, is a valid exercise of that power. The requirement is reasonable and
necessary to prevent the accumulation of leaves, papers and other waste ma-
terials against the board, thus creating a fire hazard to neighboring property,




State v. Mallahan, Wash., ii8-Pac. 898. At Court House. Upon the trial
of a criminal case, the defendant's counsel stated that a witness was confined
to her bed, and unable to attend court, and asked that the jury might go where
she was and take her testimony at her home. The state objected and the objec-
tion was sustained. Held, that the method and manner of conducting the trial
is purely within the discretion of the trial court, except where regulated by
statute. There is no absolute right to have any part of the trial take place any-
where except in the place fixed by law. Hence it was not error to sdeny the
request.
Cina et al. v. U. S., 191 Fed. 718. Conduict of Trial Judge. Remarks made
by the trial judge to counsel for defendants in a criminal case, and his refusal
to permit counsel to continue the cross-examination of a witness, held, while
error, to have been without prejudice, where the, same witness was on the stand,
and there was a further opportunity for cross-examination.
Carter v. State, Miss., 56. So. 454. At Court House. The defendant, in a
criminal case, applied for a continuance on account of the absence of a material
witness, who was very sick in his home at the town where the court was held.
The court denied the application, and over the defendant's objection, adjourned
the whole court, parties, sheriff,- clerk, and district attorney to the home of
the witness, and there tendered the witness to counsel for the defendant for
examination. He declined to examine the witness on the ground that the court
house was the place provided by law for the trial of cases. Held, that the defend-
ant could not be forced to trial at any place other than the court house. If he
had consented to examine the witness at his home, he could not have objected
to the irregularity, but as he refused, it was a fatal error to deny his applica-
tion for a continuance, and the conviction was reversed.
VERDICT DEFECTIVE.
Suitor v. Lewis, Okla. App., 118 Pac. 412. Harmless Error. One of the
forms of verdict handed to the jury by the court was defective because it by
implication instructed the jury that, if they convicted the defendant of assault
and battery, they must both sentence him-to imprisonment in the county jail
and fine him, while under the statute they might do either or both. The jury
adopted this form of verdict. There was a general exception to all the forms
submitted and a special exception to one of the other forms. In the general
charge there was a correct instruction as to the punishment. The evidence
clearly established that the-defendant was guilty, not merely of an assault and
battery, but of a felonious assault. Held, that it was error in favor of the de-
fendant for the court to- charge on the law of assault and battery, of which
he cannot complain. Therefore no purpose would be served by granting a new
trial on account of the error in the form of the verdict. In the light of the
entire testimony, the error was clearly harmless.
Glickstein V. U. S., 32 Sup. Ct. Reptr. 71. Immunity Clause in Bankrupt Act.
The immunity clause in the bankrupt act of July I, 1898, Sec. 7, Subd. 9, that
no testimony given by the bankrupt under command of that section 'hall be
offered in evidence against him in any criminal proceeding, does not bar a,




Commonwealth v. Shooshanian, Mlass., 96 N. E. 7o. A witness may, in
English and without an interpreter, state a conversation held in a foreign
language.
Holloway v. State, Ga. Ct. App., 72 S. E. 512. Effect of Impeachment.
Defendant was convicted of the illegal sale of liquors. The only direct evidence
of a sale by the defendant was given by a witness who testified on cross-
examination as follows: "I know my character. It is bad. Sometimes I
would, and sometimes I would not, believe myself under oath. I believe myself
in this case." It was proved that he went into the defendant's house without
having any whisky and brought out a bottle of whisky and the change from
the money given him to buy it. The defendant testified that she sold him no
liquor, but that he had left a basket containing whisky in her house a few days
before and that he came in, took something from the basket and carried it out.
Held, that though the witness was unworthy of credit, yet the circumstances
of corroboration shown by the other evidence might authorize the inference
that he was telling the truth in this case. The jury have power to credit a
witness unless the facts testified to by him be, according to the common knowl-
edge of mankind, inherently impossible. Conviction affirmed.
Berry v. State, Ga. Ct. App., 72 S. E. 433. Children. On-examination as
to her competency, a girl of twelve testified that she knew right from wrong,
that she ought to do right and that it was wrong to tell a lie and right to tell
the truth, but said she did not know where she would go after death if she
.failed to do right. Held, that she was competent. "She could hardly be ex--
pected to give a categorical answer to a question which has been from time
immemorial, and which still is, puzzling some of the wisest men of all times."
